Operando na binance pelo tradingview #bitcoin #binance # ...

Electrum import from Bitaddress - getting popup - "unsupported operand type" /r/Bitcoin

Electrum import from Bitaddress - getting popup - submitted by BitcoinAllBot to BitcoinAll [link] [comments]

TIL: According to Satoshi's code, a new Bitcoin mine was to be discovered in every 2140 years.

I was checking the following thread, while I found certain messages are removed.
https://np.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/fmcoa9/technical_question_why_was_sending_bitcoin_to_ip/
Hence, I looked for the removed messages and found the following.
https://snew.notabug.io/Bitcoin/comments/fmcoa9/technical_question_why_was_sending_bitcoin_to_ip/
Notice the following comment by CPD_Project
Not only this. Satoshi wanted a new BTC mine to be discovered in every 2140 years, which will reward 50 BTC to miners again followed by block halving in every 4 years. If I am not wrong, it was changed through a PR by pwuille.
Why /Bitcoin mods will remove such a harmless comment?
Is there any propaganda to cover up this fact?
In case of BCH, will a new mine be discovered in every 2140 years?
submitted by rapidYouth to btc [link] [comments]

Linear Regression following Sentdex's tutorials

Hello. I am trying to do some machine learning on some bitcoin data, specifically linear regression. The full code is here, but in order to plot it on a graph, I want to use the values of y (which is the values of x in 14.5 days time, so price in 14.5 days time) where I use the old actual values of y followed by the new values of y which are the predictions. In order to do this I need to find the values of X which have values for y (the predictions) and the values for x which already have the price in 14.5 days time. I performed a shift on the data, meaning some Xs have values for Y in 14.5 days time and some don't.
Why 14.5 days? As the data set is 1450 days long and I did a 0.01 negative shift. Hopefully I communicated what I was trying to say alright.
import pandas as pd import math import numpy as np from sklearn import preprocessing, svm from sklearn.model_selection import cross_validate from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split from sklearn.linear_model import LinearRegression from statistics import mean import matplotlib.pyplot as plt from matplotlib import style df = pd.read_csv("coinbaseUSD_1-min_data_2014-12-01_to_2019-01-09.csv") df['date'] = pd.to_datetime(df['Timestamp'],unit='s').dt.date print("calculating...") forecast_col = 'Weighted_Price' forecast_out = int(math.ceil(0.01*len(df))) #forecast_out = 20998 = 20998 minutes = 14.5 days df['label'] = df[forecast_col].shift(-forecast_out) df = df[['date', 'Weighted_Price', 'label']] df.dropna(inplace=True) X = np.array(df['Weighted_Price'], dtype = np.float64) y = np.array(df['label'], dtype=np.float64) X_lately = X[-forecast_out:] X = X[:-forecast_out:] def best_fit_line(X, y): m = (((mean(X) * mean(y)) - mean(X*y)) / ((mean(X) * mean(X)) - mean(X*X))) c = mean(y) - (m * (mean(X))) return m, c m, c = best_fit_line(X, y) print(m, c) regression_line = [(m*values) for values in X] plt.scatter(X, y) plt.plot(X, regression_line) plt.show()

So what have I tried? The offender is this line here:
X_lately = X[-forecast_out:] X = X[:-forecast_out:]
That is what sentdex did in the video series, but I get the error: ValueError: operands could not be broadcast together with shapes (1871868,) (1892866,)
This doesn't work with:
m = (((mean(X) * mean(y)) - mean(X*y)) / ((mean(X) * mean(X)) - mean(X*X)))
due to this making the X and Ys different lengths? I'm not sure.
What am I doing wrong?
submitted by EnvironmentalPause5 to learnpython [link] [comments]

IOTA, and When to Expect the COO to be Removed

Hello All,
This post is meant to address the elephant in the room, and the #1 criticism that IOTA gets which is the existence of the Coordinator node.
The Coordinator or, COO for short, is a special piece of software that is operated by the IOTA Foundation. This software's function is to drop "milestone" transactions onto the Tangle that help in ordering of Transactions.
As this wonderful post on reddit highlights (https://www.reddit.com/Iota/comments/7c3qu8/coordinator_explained/)
When you want to know if a transaction is verified, you find the newest Milestone and you see if it indirectly verifies your transaction (i.e it verifies your transaction, or if verifies a transaction that verifies your transaction, or if it verifies a transaction that verifies a transaction that verifies your transaction, etc). The reason that the Milestones exist is because if you just picked any random transaction, there's the possibility that the node you're connected to is malicious and is trying to trick you into verifying its transactions. The people who operate nodes can't fake the signatures on Milestones, so you know you can trust the Milestones to be legit.
The COO protects the network, that is great right?
No, it is not.
The coordinator represents a centralized entity that draws the ire of the concurrency community in general is the reason behind a lot of FUD.
Here is where things get dicey. If you ask the IOTA Foundation, the last official response I heard was
We are running super computer simulations with the University of St. Peteresburg to determine when that could be a possibility.
This answer didn't satisfy me, so I've spent the last few weeks thinking about the problem and think I can explain the challenges that the IOTA Foundation are up against, what they expect to model with the super computer simulations, and what ultimately what my intuition (backed up by some back of the napkin mathematics) tells me that outcomes will be.
In order to understand the bounds of the problem, we first need to understand what our measuring stick is.
Our measuring stick provides measurements with respect to hashed per second. A hash, is a mathematical operation that blockchain (and DAG) based applications require before accepting your transaction. This is generally thought of as an anti-spam measure used to protect a blockchain network.
IOTA and Bitcoin share some things in common, and one of those things is that they both require Proof of Work in order to interact with the blockchain.
In IOTA, a single hash is completed for each Transaction that you submit. You complete this PoW at the time of submitting your Transaction, and you never revisit it again.
In Bitcoin, hashes are guessed at by millions of computers (miners) competing to be the first person to find solve the correct hash, and ultimately mint a new block.
Because of the competitive nature of the bitcoin mining mechanism, the bitcoin hashrate is a sustained hashrate, while the IOTA hashrate is "bursty" going through peaks and valleys as new transactions are submitted.
Essentially, IOTA performance is a function of the current throughput of the network. While, bitcoin's performance is a delicate balance between all collective miners, the hashing difficulty with the goal of pegging the block time to 10 minutes.
With all that said, I hope it is clear that we can come to the following conclusion.
The amount of CPU time required to compute 1 Bitcoin hash is much much greater then the amount of CPU time required to compute 1 IOTA hash.
T(BtcHash) >> T(IotaHash)
After all, low powered IOT devices are supposed to be able to execute the IOTA hashing function in order to submit their own transactions.
A "hash" has be looked at as an amount of work that needs to be completed. If you are solving a bitcoin hash, it will take a lot more work to solve then an IOTA hash.
When we want to measure IOTA, we usually look at "Transactions Per Second". Since each Transaction requires a single Hash to be completed, we can translate this measurement into "Hashes Per Second" that the entire network supports.
IOTA has seen Transactions Per Second on the order of magnitude of <100. That means, that at current adoption levels the IOTA network is supported and secured by 100 IOTA hashes per second (on a very good day).
Bitcoin hashes are much more difficult to solve. The bitcoin network is secured by 1 Bitcoin hash every 10 minutes (which adjust's it's difficult over time to remain pegged at 10 minutes). (More details on bitcoin mining: https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/)
Without the COOs protection, IOTA would be a juicy target destroy. With only 100 IOTA hashes per second securing the network, that means that an individual would only need to maintain a sustained 34 hashes per second in order to completely take over the network.
Personally, my relatively moderate gaming PC takes about 60 seconds to solve IOTA Proof of Work before my transaction will be submitted to the Tangle. This is not a beastly machine, nor does it utilize specialized hardware to solve my Proof of Work. This gaming PC cost about $1000 to build, and provides me .0166 hashes per second.
**Using this figure, we can derive that consumer electronics provide hashing efficiency of roughly $60,000 USD / Hash / Second ($60k per hash per second) on the IOTA network.
Given that the Tx/Second of IOTA is around 100 on a good day, and it requires $60,000 USD to acquire 1Hash/Second of computing power we would need 34 * $60,000 to attack the IOTA network.
The total amount of money required to 34% the IOTA project is $2,040,00
This is a very small number. Not only that, but the hash rate required to conduct such an attack already exists, and it is likely that this attack has already been attempted.
The simple truth is, that due to the economic incentive of mining the hash rate required to attack IOTA is already centralized, and are foaming at the mouth to attack IOTA. This is why the Coordinator exists, and why it will not be going anywhere anytime soon.
The most important thing that needs to occur to remove the COO, is that the native measurement of transactions per second (which ultimately also measures the hashes per second) need to go drastically up in orders of magnitude.
If the IOTA transaction volume were to increase to 1000 transactions per second, then it would require 340 transactions per second from a malicious actor to compromise the network. In order to complete 340 transactions per second, the attacker would need now need the economic power of 340 * $60,000 to 34% attack the IOTA network.
In this hypothetical scenario, the cost of attacking the IOTA network is $20,400,000. This number is still pretty small, but at least you can see the pattern. IOTA will likely need to hit many-thousand transactions per second before it can be considered secure.
What we have to keep in mind here, is that IOTA has an ace up their sleeve, and that Ace is JINN Labs and the ternary processor that they are working on.
Ultimately, JINN is the end-game for the IOTA project that will make the removal of the COO a reality.
In order to understand what JINN is, we need to understand a little bit about computer architecture and the nature of computational instruction in general.
A "processor" is a piece of hardware that performs micro calculations. These micro calculations are usually very simple, such as adding two numbers, subtracting two numbers, incrementing, decrementing, and the like. The operation that is completed (addition, subtraction) is called the opcode while the numbers being operated on are called the operands.
Traditional processors, like the ones you find in my "regular gaming PC" are binary processors where both the opcode and operands are expected to be binary numbers (or a collection of 0s and 1s).
The JINN processor, provides the same functionality, mainly a hardware implementation of micro instructions. However, it expects the opcodes and operands to be ternary numbers (or a collection of 0s, 1s, and 2s).
I won't get into the computational data density of base 2 vs. base 3 processors, nor will get I get into the energy efficiency of those processors. What I will be getting into however, is how certain tasks are simpler to solve in certain number systems.
Depending on what operations are being executed upon the operands, performing the calculation in a different base will actually reduce the amount of steps required, and thus the execution time of the calculation. For an example, see how base 12 has been argued to be superior to base 10 (https://io9.gizmodo.com/5977095/why-we-should-switch-to-a-base-12-counting-system)
I want to be clear here. I am not saying that any 1 number system is superior to any other number system for all types of operations. I am simply saying, that there exist certain types of calculations that are easier to perform in base 2, then they are performed in base 10. Likewise, there are calculations that are vastly simpler in base 3 then they are in base 2.
The IOTA POW, and the algorithms required to solve for it is one of these algorithms. The IOTA PoW was designed to be ternary in nature, and I suggest that this is the reason right here. The data density and electricity savings that JINN provides are great, but the real design decision that has led to base 3 has been that they can now manufacture hardware that is superior at solving their own PoW calculations.
Binary emulation, is when a binary processor is asked to perform ternary operations. A binary processor is completely able to solve ternary hashes, but in order to do so it will need to emulate the ternary micro instructions at a higher level in the application stack from away from the hardware.
If you had access to a base 3 processor, and needed perform a base 3 addition operation you could easily ask your processor to natively perform that calculation.
If all you have access to, is a base 2 processor, you would need to emulate a base 3 number system in software. This would ultimately result in a higher number of instructions passing through your processor, more electricity being utilized, more time to complete.
Finally, let's review these figures.
It costs roughly $60k to acquire 1hash per second in BASE 2 consumer electrictronic. It costs roughly $2M to acquire enough BASE 2 hash rate to 34% the IOTA network.
JINN, will be specifically manufactured hardware that will solve base 3 hashes natively. What this likely means, is that $1 spent on JINN will be much more effective at acquiring base 3 hash rate then $1 spent on base 2 hash rate.
Finally, with bitcoin and traditional block chain applications there lies economic incentive to amass mining hardware.
It first starts out by a miner earning income from his mining rig. He then reinvests those profits on additional hardware to increase his income.
Eventually, this spirals into an arms raise where the players that are left in the game have increasingly available resources up until the point that there are only a handful of players left.
This economic incentive, creates a mass centralization of computing resources capable of being misused in a coordinated effort to attack a cryptocurrency.
IOTA aims to break this economic incentive, and the centralization that is causes. However, over the short term the fact that the centralization of such resources does exist is an existential peril to IOTA, and the COO is an inconvenient truth that we all have to live with.
Due to all the above, I think we can come to the following conclusions:
  1. IOTA will not be able to remove the COO until the transactions per second (and ultimately hashrate) increase by orders of magnitude.
  2. The performance of JINN processors, and their advantage of being able to compute natively on ternary operands and opcodes will be important for the value ratio of $USD / hash rate on the IOTA network
  3. Existing mining hardware is at a fundamental disadvantage to computing base 3 hashes when compared to a JINN processor designed specifically for that function
  4. Attrition of centralized base 2 hash power will occur if the practice of mining can be defeated and the income related to it. Then the incentive of amassing a huge amount of centralized computing power will be reduced.
  5. JINN processors, and their adoption in consume electronics (like cell phones and cars) hold the key in being able to provide enough "bursty" hash rate to defend the network from 34% attacks without the help of the COO.
  6. What are the super computer simulations? I think they are simulating a few things. They are modeling tip selection algorithms to reduce the amount of unverified transactions, however I think they may also be performing some simulations regarding the above calculations. JINN processors have not been released yet, so the performance benchmarks, manufacturing costs, retail costs, and adoption rates are all variables that I cannot account for. The IF probably has much better insight into all of those figures, which will allow them to better understand when the techno-economic environment would be conducive to the disabling of the COO.
  7. The COO will likely be decentralized before it is removed. With all this taken into account, the date that the COO will be removed is years off if I was forced to guess. This means, that decentralizing the COO itself would be a sufficient stop-gap to the centralized COO that we see today.
submitted by localhost87 to Iota [link] [comments]

Are nChain/BSV-style bitwise shifts good engineering?

It appears the nChain/BSV proposal for modified OP_LSHIFT and OP_RSHIFT opcodes is still on the ABC roadmap for May 2019. Since these changes remain in play even as BSV and its absurd mandate to arbitrarily limit available opcode count lose relevance, it is worth while to give them proper consideration.
A quick review of the alterations. Originally, OPLSHIFT and OP_RSHIFT were _arithmetic operations. That means they operated on numeric values and preserved sign (positive or negative). Under the BSV-inspired implementation, they now operate against arbitrary byte vectors, with no notion or respect for numeric values.
I've brought this issue up several times, usually in the context of how it diverges from BSV's stated goal of "restoring the v0.1 protocol and locking it down." However, BSV's desires and goals are not the same as ABC's or the rest of the BCH ecosystem. Let us then consider the proposed changes on their own technical merits. Is the proposed implementation sound engineering?
At first pass, it appears to be a trivial matter. OP_LSHIFT and OP_RSHIFT are logical shifts vs the original arithmetic shifts. Not a big deal if we can also add new arithmetic shift operators should the need arise. But there is a second alteration in the proposal that makes it not so clear cut - the new opcodes operate on arbitrary byte vectors, not numeric values. This is actually a big deal.
In most languages and systems, bitwise shift operations generally use the numeric value of an input, regardless of how the value is physically stored in memory. This happens for both the arithmetic and logical forms. However, Bitcoin script encodes its numeric values in little endian and the proposed opcodes act on their operands essentially as if they were big endian. On most platforms which store numeric values in little endian, the BSV-proposed implementation would be considered erroneous behavior.
Although bitwise operations are performed against the binary expression of their inputs, they are generally considered mathematical operations and are performed against the binary expression of the value rather than the raw memory representation of an input. The nChain/BSV proposed implementations of OP_LSHIFT and OP_RSHIFT violate basic expectations of mathematical operations by making them endian-sensitive and opposite to the platform's native numeric representation. This poor design is certain to lead to confusion and Script developer error if implemented in BCH.
submitted by cryptocached to btc [link] [comments]

IOTA, the COO and Inconvenient Truths

Hello All,
This post is meant to address the elephant in the room, and the #1 criticism that IOTA gets which is the existence of the Coordinator node.
The Coordinator or, COO for short, is a special piece of software that is operated by the IOTA Foundation. This software's function is to drop "milestone" transactions onto the Tangle that help in ordering of Transactions.
As this wonderful post on reddit highlights (https://www.reddit.com/Iota/comments/7c3qu8/coordinator_explained/)
When you want to know if a transaction is verified, you find the newest Milestone and you see if it indirectly verifies your transaction (i.e it verifies your transaction, or if verifies a transaction that verifies your transaction, or if it verifies a transaction that verifies a transaction that verifies your transaction, etc). The reason that the Milestones exist is because if you just picked any random transaction, there's the possibility that the node you're connected to is malicious and is trying to trick you into verifying its transactions. The people who operate nodes can't fake the signatures on Milestones, so you know you can trust the Milestones to be legit.
The COO protects the network, that is great right?
No, it is not.
The coordinator represents a centralized entity that draws the ire of the concurrency community in general is the reason behind a lot of FUD.
Here is where things get dicey. If you ask the IOTA Foundation, the last official response I heard was
We are running super computer simulations with the University of St. Peteresburg to determine when that could be a possibility.
This answer didn't satisfy me, so I've spent the last few weeks thinking about the problem and think I can explain the challenges that the IOTA Foundation are up against, what they expect to model with the super computer simulations, and what ultimately what my intuition (backed up by some back of the napkin mathematics) tells me that outcomes will be.
In order to understand the bounds of the problem, we first need to understand what our measuring stick is.
Our measuring stick provides measurements with respect to hashed per second. A hash, is a mathematical operation that blockchain (and DAG) based applications require before accepting your transaction. This is generally thought of as an anti-spam measure used to protect a blockchain network.
IOTA and Bitcoin share some things in common, and one of those things is that they both require Proof of Work in order to interact with the blockchain.
In IOTA, a single hash is completed for each Transaction that you submit. You complete this PoW at the time of submitting your Transaction, and you never revisit it again.
In Bitcoin, hashes are guessed at by millions of computers (miners) competing to be the first person to find solve the correct hash, and ultimately mint a new block.
Because of the competitive nature of the bitcoin mining mechanism, the bitcoin hashrate is a sustained hashrate, while the IOTA hashrate is "bursty" going through peaks and valleys as new transactions are submitted.
Essentially, IOTA performance is a function of the current throughput of the network. While, bitcoin's performance is a delicate balance between all collective miners, the hashing difficulty with the goal of pegging the block time to 10 minutes.
With all that said, I hope it is clear that we can come to the following conclusion.
The amount of CPU time required to compute 1 Bitcoin hash is much much greater then the amount of CPU time required to compute 1 IOTA hash.
T(BtcHash) >> T(IotaHash)
After all, low powered IOT devices are supposed to be able to execute the IOTA hashing function in order to submit their own transactions.
A "hash" has be looked at as an amount of work that needs to be completed. If you are solving a bitcoin hash, it will take a lot more work to solve then an IOTA hash.
When we want to measure IOTA, we usually look at "Transactions Per Second". Since each Transaction requires a single Hash to be completed, we can translate this measurement into "Hashes Per Second" that the entire network supports.
IOTA has seen Transactions Per Second on the order of magnitude of <100. That means, that at current adoption levels the IOTA network is supported and secured by 100 IOTA hashes per second (on a very good day).
Bitcoin hashes are much more difficult to solve. The bitcoin network is secured by 1 Bitcoin hash every 10 minutes (which adjust's it's difficult over time to remain pegged at 10 minutes). (More details on bitcoin mining: https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/)
Without the COOs protection, IOTA would be a juicy target destroy. With only 100 IOTA hashes per second securing the network, that means that an individual would only need to maintain a sustained 34 hashes per second in order to completely take over the network.
Personally, my relatively moderate gaming PC takes about 60 seconds to solve IOTA Proof of Work before my transaction will be submitted to the Tangle. This is not a beastly machine, nor does it utilize specialized hardware to solve my Proof of Work. This gaming PC cost about $1000 to build, and provides me .0166 hashes per second.
**Using this figure, we can derive that consumer electronics provide hashing efficiency of roughly $60,000 USD / Hash / Second ($60k per hash per second) on the IOTA network.
Given that the Tx/Second of IOTA is around 100 on a good day, and it requires $60,000 USD to acquire 1Hash/Second of computing power we would need 34 * $60,000 to attack the IOTA network.
The total amount of money required to 34% the IOTA project is $2,040,00
This is a very small number. Not only that, but the hash rate required to conduct such an attack already exists, and it is likely that this attack has already been attempted.
The simple truth is, that due to the economic incentive of mining the hash rate required to attack IOTA is already centralized, and are foaming at the mouth to attack IOTA. This is why the Coordinator exists, and why it will not be going anywhere anytime soon.
The most important thing that needs to occur to remove the COO, is that the native measurement of transactions per second (which ultimately also measures the hashes per second) need to go drastically up in orders of magnitude.
If the IOTA transaction volume were to increase to 1000 transactions per second, then it would require 340 transactions per second from a malicious actor to compromise the network. In order to complete 340 transactions per second, the attacker would need now need the economic power of 340 * $60,000 to 34% attack the IOTA network.
In this hypothetical scenario, the cost of attacking the IOTA network is $20,400,000. This number is still pretty small, but at least you can see the pattern. IOTA will likely need to hit many-thousand transactions per second before it can be considered secure.
What we have to keep in mind here, is that IOTA has an ace up their sleeve, and that Ace is JINN Labs and the ternary processor that they are working on.
Ultimately, JINN is the end-game for the IOTA project that will make the removal of the COO a reality.
In order to understand what JINN is, we need to understand a little bit about computer architecture and the nature of computational instruction in general.
A "processor" is a piece of hardware that performs micro calculations. These micro calculations are usually very simple, such as adding two numbers, subtracting two numbers, incrementing, decrementing, and the like. The operation that is completed (addition, subtraction) is called the opcode while the numbers being operated on are called the operands.
Traditional processors, like the ones you find in my "regular gaming PC" are binary processors where both the opcode and operands are expected to be binary numbers (or a collection of 0s and 1s).
The JINN processor, provides the same functionality, mainly a hardware implementation of micro instructions. However, it expects the opcodes and operands to be ternary numbers (or a collection of 0s, 1s, and 2s).
I won't get into the computational data density of base 2 vs. base 3 processors, nor will get I get into the energy efficiency of those processors. What I will be getting into however, is how certain tasks are simpler to solve in certain number systems.
Depending on what operations are being executed upon the operands, performing the calculation in a different base will actually reduce the amount of steps required, and thus the execution time of the calculation. For an example, see how base 12 has been argued to be superior to base 10 (https://io9.gizmodo.com/5977095/why-we-should-switch-to-a-base-12-counting-system)
I want to be clear here. I am not saying that any 1 number system is superior to any other number system for all types of operations. I am simply saying, that there exist certain types of calculations that are easier to perform in base 2, then they are performed in base 10. Likewise, there are calculations that are vastly simpler in base 3 then they are in base 2.
The IOTA POW, and the algorithms required to solve for it is one of these algorithms. The IOTA PoW was designed to be ternary in nature, and I suggest that this is the reason right here. The data density and electricity savings that JINN provides are great, but the real design decision that has led to base 3 has been that they can now manufacture hardware that is superior at solving their own PoW calculations.
Binary emulation, is when a binary processor is asked to perform ternary operations. A binary processor is completely able to solve ternary hashes, but in order to do so it will need to emulate the ternary micro instructions at a higher level in the application stack from away from the hardware.
If you had access to a base 3 processor, and needed perform a base 3 addition operation you could easily ask your processor to natively perform that calculation.
If all you have access to, is a base 2 processor, you would need to emulate a base 3 number system in software. This would ultimately result in a higher number of instructions passing through your processor, more electricity being utilized, more time to complete.
Finally, let's review these figures.
It costs roughly $60k to acquire 1hash per second in BASE 2 consumer electrictronic. It costs roughly $2M to acquire enough BASE 2 hash rate to 34% the IOTA network.
JINN, will be specifically manufactured hardware that will solve base 3 hashes natively. What this likely means, is that $1 spent on JINN will be much more effective at acquiring base 3 hash rate then $1 spent on base 2 hash rate.
Finally, with bitcoin and traditional block chain applications there lies economic incentive to amass mining hardware.
It first starts out by a miner earning income from his mining rig. He then reinvests those profits on additional hardware to increase his income.
Eventually, this spirals into an arms raise where the players that are left in the game have increasingly available resources up until the point that there are only a handful of players left.
This economic incentive, creates a mass centralization of computing resources capable of being misused in a coordinated effort to attack a cryptocurrency.
IOTA aims to break this economic incentive, and the centralization that is causes. However, over the short term the fact that the centralization of such resources does exist is an existential peril to IOTA, and the COO is an inconvenient truth that we all have to live with.
Due to all the above, I think we can come to the following conclusions:
  1. IOTA will not be able to remove the COO until the transactions per second (and ultimately hashrate) increase by orders of magnitude.
  2. The performance of JINN processors, and their advantage of being able to compute natively on ternary operands and opcodes will be important for the value ratio of $USD / hash rate on the IOTA network
  3. Existing mining hardware is at a fundamental disadvantage to computing base 3 hashes when compared to a JINN processor designed specifically for that function
  4. Attrition of centralized base 2 hash power will occur if the practice of mining can be defeated and the income related to it. Then the incentive of amassing a huge amount of centralized computing power will be reduced.
  5. JINN processors, and their adoption in consume electronics (like cell phones and cars) hold the key in being able to provide enough "bursty" hash rate to defend the network from 34% attacks without the help of the COO.
submitted by localhost87 to MovingPixels [link] [comments]

Relative CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (was CLTV proposal) | Matt Corallo | Mar 16 2015

Matt Corallo on Mar 16 2015:
In building some CLTV-based contracts, it is often also useful to have a
method of requiring, instead of locktime-is-at-least-N,
locktime-is-at-least-N-plus-the-height-of-my-input. ie you could imagine
an OP_RELATIVECHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY that reads (does not pop) the top
stack element, adds the height of the output being spent and then has
identical semantics to CLTV.
A slightly different API (and different name) was described by maaku at
http://www.reddit.com/Bitcoin/comments/2z2l91/time_to_lobby_bitcoins_core_devs_sf_bitcoin_devs/cpgc154
which does a better job of saving softfork-available opcode space.
There are two major drawbacks to adding such an operation, however.
1) More transaction information is exposed inside the script (prior to
CLTV we only had the sigchecking operation exposed, with a CLTV and
RCLTV/OP_CHECK_MATURITY_VERIFY we expose two more functions).
2) Bitcoin Core's mempool invariant of "all transactions in the mempool
could be thrown into one overside block and aside from block size, it
would be valid" becomes harder to enforce. Currently, during reorgs,
coinbase spends need checked (specifically, anything spending THE
coinbase 100 blocks ago needs checked) and locktime transactions need
checked. With such a new operation, any script which used this new
opcode during its execution would need to be re-evaluated during reorgs.
I think both of these requirements are reasonable and not particularly
cumbersome, and the value of such an operation is quite nice for some
protocols (including settings setting up a contest interval in a
sidechain data validation operation).
Thoughts?
Matt
On 10/01/14 13:08, Peter Todd wrote:
I've written a reference implementation and BIP draft for a new opcode,
CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY. The BIP, reproduced below, can be found at:
https://github.com/petertodd/bips/blob/checklocktimeverify/bip-checklocktimeverify.mediawiki
The reference implementation, including a full-set of unittests for the
opcode semantics can be found at:
https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/compare/checklocktimeverify

BIP:
Title: OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY
Author: Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org>
Status: Draft
Type: Standards Track
Created: 2014-10-01

==Abstract==
This BIP describes a new opcode (OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY) for the Bitcoin
scripting system that allows a transaction output to be made unspendable until
some point in the future.
==Summary==
CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY re-defines the existing NOP2 opcode. When executed it
compares the top item on the stack to the nLockTime field of the transaction
containing the scriptSig. If that top stack item is greater than the transation
nLockTime the script fails immediately, otherwise script evaluation continues
as though a NOP was executed.
The nLockTime field in a transaction prevents the transaction from being mined
until either a certain block height, or block time, has been reached. By
comparing the argument to CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY against the nLockTime field, we
indirectly verify that the desired block height or block time has been reached;
until that block height or block time has been reached the transaction output
remains unspendable.
==Motivation==
The nLockTime field in transactions makes it possible to prove that a
transaction output can be spent in the future: a valid signature for a
transaction with the desired nLockTime can be constructed, proving that it is
possible to spend the output with that signature when the nLockTime is reached.
An example where this technique is used is in micro-payment channels, where the
nLockTime field proves that should the receiver vanish the sender is guaranteed
to get all their escrowed funds back when the nLockTime is reached.
However the nLockTime field is insufficient if you wish to prove that
transaction output ''can-not'' be spent until some time in the future, as there
is no way to prove that the secret keys corresponding to the pubkeys controling
the funds have not been used to create a valid signature.
===Escrow===
If Alice and Bob jointly operate a business they may want to
ensure that all funds are kept in 2-of-2 multisig transaction outputs that
require the co-operation of both parties to spend. However, they recognise that
in exceptional circumstances such as either party getting "hit by a bus" they
need a backup plan to retrieve the funds. So they appoint their lawyer, Lenny,
to act as a third-party.
With a standard 2-of-3 CHECKMULTISIG at any time Lenny could conspire with
either Alice or Bob to steal the funds illegitimately. Equally Lenny may prefer
not to have immediate access to the funds to discourage bad actors from
attempting to get the secret keys from him by force.
However with CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY the funds can be stored in scriptPubKeys of
the form:
IF  CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP  CHECKSIGVERIFY 1 ELSE 2 ENDIF   2 CHECKMULTISIG 
At any time the funds can be spent with the following scriptSig:
  0 
After 3 months have passed Lenny and one of either Alice or Bob can spend the
funds with the following scriptSig:
  1 
===Non-interactive time-locked refunds===
There exist a number of protocols where a transaction output is created that
the co-operation of both parties to spend the output. To ensure the failure of
one party does not result in the funds becoming lost refund transactions are
setup in advance using nLockTime. These refund transactions need to be created
interactively, and additionaly, are currently vulnerable to transaction
mutability. CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY can be used in these protocols, replacing the
interactive setup with a non-interactive setup, and additionally, making
transaction mutability a non-issue.
====Two-factor wallets====
Services like GreenAddress store Bitcoins with 2-of-2 multisig scriptPubKey's
such that one keypair is controlled by the user, and the other keypair is
controlled by the service. To spend funds the user uses locally installed
wallet software that generates one of the required signatures, and then uses a
2nd-factor authentication method to authorize the service to create the second
SIGHASH_NONE signature that is locked until some time in the future and sends
the user that signature for storage. If the user needs to spend their funds and
the service is not available, they wait until the nLockTime expires.
The problem is there exist numerous occasions the user will not have a valid
signature for some or all of their transaction outputs. With
CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY rather than creating refund signatures on demand
scriptPubKeys of the following form are used instead:
IF  CHECKSIGVERIFY ELSE  CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP ENDIF  CHECKSIG 
Now the user is always able to spend their funds without the co-operation of
the service by waiting for the expiry time to be reached.
====Micropayment Channels====
Jeremy Spilman style micropayment channels first setup a deposit controlled by
2-of-2 multisig, tx1, and then adjust a second transaction, tx2, that spends
the output of tx1 to payor and payee. Prior to publishing tx1 a refund
transaction is created, tx3, to ensure that should the payee vanish the payor
can get their deposit back. The process by which the refund transaction is
created is currently vulnerable to transaction mutability attacks, and
additionally, requires the payor to store the refund. Using the same
scriptPubKey from as in the Two-factor wallets example solves both these issues.
===Trustless Payments for Publishing Data===
The PayPub protocol makes it possible to pay for information in a trustless way
by first proving that an encrypted file contains the desired data, and secondly
crafting scriptPubKeys used for payment such that spending them reveals the
encryption keys to the data. However the existing implementation has a
significant flaw: the publisher can delay the release of the keys indefinitely.
This problem can be solved interactively with the refund transaction technique;
with CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY the problem can be non-interactively solved using
scriptPubKeys of the following form:
IF HASH160  EQUALVERIFY  CHECKSIG ELSE  CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY DROP  CHECKSIG ENDIF 
The buyer of the data is now making a secure offer with an expiry time. If the
publisher fails to accept the offer before the expiry time is reached the buyer
can cancel the offer by spending the output.
===Proving sacrifice to miners' fees===
Proving the sacrifice of some limited resource is a common technique in a
variety of cryptographic protocols. Proving sacrifices of coins to mining fees
has been proposed as a ''universal public good'' to which the sacrifice could
be directed, rather than simply destroying the coins. However doing so is
non-trivial, and even the best existing technqiue - announce-commit sacrifices
create outputs that are provably spendable by anyone (thus to mining fees
assuming miners behave optimally and rationally) but only at a time
sufficiently far into the future that large miners profitably can't sell the
sacrifices at a discount.
===Replacing the nLockTime field entirely===
As an aside, note how if the SignatureHash() algorithm could optionally cover
part of the scriptSig the signature could require that the scriptSig contain
CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY opcodes, and additionally, require that they be executed.
(the CODESEPARATOR opcode came very close to making this possible in v0.1 of
Bitcoin) This per-signature capability could replace the per-transaction
nLockTime field entirely as a valid signature would now be the proof that a
transaction output ''can'' be spent.
==Detailed Specification==
Refer to the reference implementation, reproduced below, for the precise
semantics and detailed rationale for those semantics.
case OP_NOP2: { // CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY // // (nLockTime -- nLockTime ) if (!(flags & SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY)) break; // not enabled; treat as a NOP if (stack.size() < 1) return false; // Note that elsewhere numeric opcodes are limited to // operands in the range -2**31+1 to 2**31-1, however it is // legal for opcodes to produce results exceeding that // range. This limitation is implemented by CScriptNum's // default 4-byte limit. // // If we kept to that limit we'd have a year 2038 problem, // even though the nLockTime field in transactions // themselves is uint32 which only becomes meaningless // after the year 2106. // // Thus as a special case we tell CScriptNum to accept up // to 5-byte bignums, which are good until 2**32-1, the // same limit as the nLockTime field itself. const CScriptNum nLockTime(stacktop(-1), 5); // In the rare event that the argument may be < 0 due to // some arithmetic being done first, you can always use // 0 MAX CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY. if (nLockTime < 0) return false; // There are two times of nLockTime: lock-by-blockheight // and lock-by-blocktime, distinguished by whether // nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD. // // We want to compare apples to apples, so fail the script // unless the type of nLockTime being tested is the same as // the nLockTime in the transaction. if (!( (txTo.nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD && nLockTime < LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD) || (txTo.nLockTime >= LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD && nLockTime >= LOCKTIME_THRESHOLD) )) return false; // Now that we know we're comparing apples-to-apples, the // comparison is a simple numeric one. if (nLockTime > (int64_t)txTo.nLockTime) return false; // Finally the nLockTime feature can be disabled and thus // CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY bypassed if every txin has been // finalized by setting nSequence to maxint. The // transaction would be allowed into the blockchain, making // the opcode ineffective. // // Testing if this vin is not final is sufficient to // prevent this condition. Alternatively we could test all // inputs, but testing just this input minimizes the data // required to prove correct CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY execution. if (txTo.vin[nIn].IsFinal()) return false; break; } 
https://github.com/petertodd/bitcoin/commit/ab0f54f38e08ee1e50ff72f801680ee84d0f1bf4
==Upgrade and Testing Plan==
TBD
==Credits==
Thanks goes to Gregory Maxwell for suggesting that the argument be compared
against the per-transaction nLockTime, rather than the current block height and
time.
==References==
PayPub - https://github.com/unsystem/paypub
Jeremy Spilman Micropayment Channels - http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development%40lists.sourceforge.net/msg02028.html
==Copyright==
This document is placed in the public domain.
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